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INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 2013, bonfires, torched cards, de-molished lampposts, and a million people filled the streets of Brazil. The protesters gath-
ered to denounce corruption, poor public services, 
police brutality, and — to the disbelief of FIFA (Inter-
national Federation of Association Football) organiz-
ers and investors — the upcoming 2014 World Cup.1 
While this was not the first time that a host country 
had experienced political and social unrest in the days 
and months leading up to FIFA’s flagship event, most 
observers had believed that the fabled Brazilian attach-
ment to soccer would prevent any large-scale protests, 
even in the face of ballooning government spending on 
the event. Popular opinion of the 2014 World Cup in 
Brazil seemed headed in the same direction as that of 
the South African FIFA World Cup in 2010, which suf-
fered a similar controversy in light of unpopular multi-
billion-dollar stadium construction costs and conten-
tious securitization policies. 
Much of the discontent revolved around the belief 
that corporate interests determined political decision-
making. Ever since Uruguay held the inaugural 1930 
FIFA World Cup, the mega-event has been used as a 
platform to rebrand countries, regenerate economies, 
and accumulate social capital.2  These benefits weigh 
heavily on the minds of bidding countries during the 
process of selecting a host nation. More recently, FIFA 
appears to have been making a concerted effort to have 
the Cup hosted in developing countries. In the past 15 
years, FIFA has accepted bids to host the event from 
countries in both Asia and Africa. The 2010 games 
were held in South Africa; and the 2014 event will be 
held in Brazil, while the 2018 and 2022 Cups will occur 
in Russia and Qatar, respectively. 
This pivot to developing countries underscores 
the commercialization of the World Cup, manifested 
through deregulation and privatization, hallmarks 
of corporate-driven governance. Corporate-driven 
governance in this paper refers to actions that large, 
private associations take to dictate political decisions, 
thereby circumventing existing democratic procedures. 
While politicians and corporate bodies often claim that 
mega-events such as the World Cup spur development 
and ultimately benefit the public, this paper will 
demonstrate that corporate-driven governance, 
manifested through stadium construction and 
securitization, subordinates the interests of those living 
on or near the mega-event sites to corporate interests. 
I look specifically at stadium construction and 
securitization and their effects on local development 
and local democratization in the South Africa and 
Brazil World Cups and argue that the processes of FIFA 
World Cup stadium development and securitization are 
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guided by corporate-driven development principles 
that significantly and negatively impact local 
development and democratization. 
I have chosen the 2010 South Africa World 
Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup as case studies 
because they are highly comparable examples 
of securitization and stadium construction. 
Furthermore, because the two countries undertook 
the momentous tasks of securitization and stadium 
construction very recently and within just a few 
years of each other, temporal bias can be eliminated. 
Because Brazil will also host the 2016 Summer 
Olympic Games, there is some overlap with World 
Cup and Olympic Securitization policies. Similarly, 
South Africa has hosted mega-events such as the 
Rugby World Cup in 1995 and also plans to host 
other major sporting events in the future with its 
greatly augmented mega-event infrastructure.
As the world’s largest single-event sporting 
competition, the World Cup has substantial political, 
economic, and social implications for the host 
countries.3 It is thus reasonable to assume such 
countries will pursue securitization measures for the 
World Cup. Securitization is the process through 
which an actor enacts and enforces measures to 
protect an object it feels is threatened; relevant 
stakeholders identify security risks and risk groups 
and then implement risk-management policies. 
In this study, corporate and state interests are the 
actors creating and enforcing such policies that aim 
to protect the World Cup. When the whole world 
is watching, the stakes are high. The securitization 
process consists of exclusion zones, stringent stadium 
design requirements, and heightened security at 
the transnational, national, and local-urban levels.4 
Some of these policies are designed to ensure that the 
World Cup games run smoothly, yet many of these 
required rules and policies exist primarily to promote 
the financial interests of FIFA and its corporate 
sponsors. This trend toward a policy of profit-seeking 
can also be seen in FIFA’s gradual expansion of 
monopolistic control over event venues, surrounding 
areas, and — more recently — main infrastructure 
(airports, train stations) and accommodation sites 
(hotels, training centers, etc.).5  
The other manifestation of corporate-driven 
governance, stadium construction, operates under 
similar market rationalities. Large corporate bodies 
influence national policies to direct public tax dollars 
toward stadium construction despite the effects such 
policies have on displaced residents. 
The paper is divided into five main sections, 
beginning with the grounding of the theory of 
corporate-driven governance in the common 
literature of mega-event research. It then examines 
the processes of securitization and stadium 
construction using the cases of the 2010 South Africa 
FIFA World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World 
Cup.  
The twin processes of securitization and 
stadium development are the most glaring 
manifestations of corporate-driven governance in 
mega-event planning. The processes of FIFA World 
Cup stadium construction in developing countries 
like South Africa and Brazil result in a governance 
structure “where decisions of public policy are made 
by business coalitions and international organizations 
like the IOC and FIFA.”6 Informed by corporate-
driven governance, securitization and stadium 
construction curb or suspend the civil liberties of the 
local community, under the assumption that mega-
events such as the World Cup are held for the “good 
of the public.”7 To further explain this, I turn to the 
phenomenon Cornelissen calls discursive framing, 
which legitimizes stadium building and securitization 
as “extraordinary and extra-legal [practices] to 
protect the collective.”8 While these processes may 
provide the local community with development and 
democratization, corporate-driven governance still 
dictates priorities, thus subordinating the public 
interest.
Discursive framing, a concept originally defined 
by French social theorist Michel Foucault, is a 
rhetorical framework employed by a privileged group 
in order to direct and shape particular ideas, actions, 
and preferences in the larger group. When Swiss 
football administrator Sepp Blatter, the eighth and 
current president of FIFA, outlined FIFA’s legacy in a 
recent interview about the upcoming games in Brazil, 
he framed the prevailing discourse around football 
and the “greater good:” 
“In football, the whole country gets the legacy… 
Football involves the whole country. The 
country improves airports, hotels, highways, 
telecommunications, [and] sustainability 
programs.”9
While there are undoubtedly some immediate 
short-term benefits from World Cup securitization 
140
columbia university journal of politics & society
and stadium construction policies, the systemic 
influence of FIFA through corporate-driven 
governance channels power away from local 
communities and toward mega-event organizers, 
international corporate sponsors, and government 
officials, thereby inhibiting sustainable local 
development. 
Securitization measures are not illogical. As 
successful bids for hosting mega-sporting events 
pivot from Western nations to the global South, there 
are added securitization obstacles arising from the 
inherent political, social, and economic conditions of 
these developing host nations. Leading mega-event 
scholar Scarlett Cornelissen details the increased 
securitization complications and needs: 
“In settings where heightened income polarities, 
societal violence, porous borders and disputed 
state capacities overlap with ‘standard’ security 
risks such as terrorism, increased attention and 
investment is being given to this process of 
securitization.”10 
Addressing these complications is an arduous 
task for developing nations such as Brazil and 
South Africa. The ramifications of addressing the 
complications surrounding securitization amount 
to a political mega-project spanning local, national, 
and transnational levels of policy. However, through 
discursive framing, policy makers and FIFA officials 
are able to justify far-reaching securitization policies. 
When justifying stadium construction, they use 
discursive framing to over-emphasize the potential 
economic, political, and societal advancements that 
follow these mega-events. 
By portraying both securitization and stadium 
construction as public goods, officials implicitly fail 
to take into account how their supposed societal 
benefits harm individuals. This mode of corporate-
driven governance sets a dangerous precedent with a 
legacy far more pernicious than an unused stadium 
or a new hotel. Eick describes how the heightened 
securitization can potentially create a “new military 
urbanism,” where the precedent of a wide-reaching 
and advanced security apparatus remains influential 
even after the fans leave.11 The perceived success 
of a World Cup can also shift priority away from 
legislative procedural norms in order to suit the 
needs and desires of a corporate environment at the 
cost of civil liberties. The broader implications make 
it even more imperative to better understand how 
stadium construction and securitization policies 
influence development and democratization in 
developing contexts.  
With this recent trend of successful bids from 
developing countries of the Global South in mind, 
however, it becomes increasingly important to 
analyze the impacts of the Cup on the host country. 
Proponents of the cup insist that economic growth 
generated by the Cup makes hosting it a net gain 
for the country. Detractors point to the enormous 
political, economic, and social investment a host 
country must make to host the World Cup as 
evidence of the event’s harm. Yet, no prior literature 
on the subject offers the in-depth look at stadium 
construction and securitization necessary to make 
a nuanced argument about the ultimate effect of 
the World Cup on host countries. To fill this gap 
in the literature, this paper analyzes the specific 
repercussions of these two particular sets of costs on 
local development and democratization associated 
with the two cases of the 2010 South Africa FIFA 
World Cup and the 2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup. 
2010 SOUTH AFRICA WORLD CUP: STRUGGLES 
OF SECURITIZATION
South Africa, with a GINI Index of 63.1, is 
the second-most economically unequal state in the 
world, only behind Lesotho. This differs greatly from 
the 2006 World Cup host country, Germany, which 
scores thirty-six points higher in the GINI Index.12 
In addition to being economically unequal, South 
Africa is one of the world’s most dangerous countries. 
Hundreds of thousands of South Africans live in 
massive slums, and the national unemployment rate 
is roughly 25 percent.13 Combined, these factors 
raised security concerns for the mega-event and 
necessitated extensive securitization procedures 
during the run-up to the event.14
Unfortunately, this need for securitization was 
co-opted by the interests of event developers and 
came at the expense of local individuals in South 
African communities. FIFA, the South African 2010 
Local Organizing Committee (LOC), the South 
African government, and multi-national corporate 
sponsors saw these games as a platform to position 
their products instead of an opportunity to improve 
the collective welfare of the South African people.15 
A “beautification” campaign created extensive 
exclusion zones for sponsors such as McDonald’s 
and Coca-Cola while marginalizing local, non-
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FIFA affiliated actors such as the slum-dwellers’ 
organizations and other local community voices.16 
This corporate-driven governance was 
seen primarily in extensive slum-eviction 
legislation passed for the purposes of security and 
“beautification”. One of the more controversial 
legislative acts, the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and 
Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act of 2007, 
aimed “[t]o provide for the progressive elimination of 
slums in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal; to provide 
for measures for the prevention of the re-emergence 
of slums; to provide for the upgrading and control of 
existing slums; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.”17 Another controversial policy was 
the N2 Gateway Pilot Project, a state-sponsored 
housing and relocation project in the city of Cape 
Town, which was criticized by major organizations 
such as COHRE as being harmful to the local 
communities’ wellbeing and having the narrow aim 
of a “beautification project” for the World Cup.18 
The Act authorized evictions of hundreds of slums 
without providing sustainably adequate housing 
alternatives as guaranteed by The Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
19 of 1998, The National Housing Act 107 of 1997, and 
The National Housing Code.
Acclaimed international reporter Dan 
McDougall conveyed local accounts of evictions 
carried out by state-sponsored mercenaries known as 
the Red Ants. In April, right before the 2010 World 
Cup began, McDougall wrote that the Red Ants 
“have become a growing force in the past few months 
as South African cities have begun a campaign of 
‘beautification’ before the World Cup begins in 
June.”19 These state-sanctioned mercenaries have 
allegedly aided in the forcible clearing of hundreds 
of shacks, destroyed slum-dwellers’ property, and 
were notorious for their brutality and violence.20 
Xenophobic rhetoric led many to believe that the Red 
Ants’ actions were motivated by ethnic tensions. The 
Red Ants evicted mostly Zimbabwean immigrants 
from more than 100 shacks within the two-kilometer 
radius of the Mbombela Stadium.21 These actions 
were justified under the FIFA requirements of a 
two-kilometer exclusion zone to give FIFA-licensed 
corporate sponsors a monopoly on food and 
merchandise sales.22 The Center on Housing Rights 
& Evictions (COHRE) has proclaimed that much of 
the escalation in slum eradication was directly linked 
to the 2010 World Cup preparations.23 
These events soon sparked persistent and 
organized protest by the 20,000 strong slum-dwellers’ 
movement, Abhali baseMjondlo (AbM). In 2005, 
AbM staged a dramatic roadblock to resist state-
sponsored police oppression and intimidation of the 
slum-dwellers. The use of live ammunition, armored 
vehicles, and helicopters against the AbM highlighted 
the extent to which the state deployed violent forces 
against the slum-dwellers.24 
The opposition to the Slums Act and subsequent 
state backlash directed against the AbM reveal 
dramatic obstacles to democratization that occurred 
as a result of the pressures of securitization policy 
leading up the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Though 
the South African Constitutional Court overturned 
the Slums Act in 2009, the initial formulation and 
implementation of the Act demonstrates how far the 
South African legislature was willing to go in order 
to “securitize” the cities in preparation for the 2010 
FIFA World Cup—even at the expense of the welfare 
of slum-dwellers.
The consequences of these securitization 
policies are still being seen. The U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported 
that “tens of thousands of South Africa’s poorest 
people face eviction from inner-city suburbs across 
the country ahead of the 2010 World Cup.”25 This 
report also focuses on the movement of evictees to 
temporary housing commonly known as “transit 
camps,” which are not intended for extended use. 
One resident recalled, “[t]hey promised us toilets and 
good houses at the transit camp…but we are left to 
die. We have been thrown away.”26 A Durban High 
court recognized the decrepit state of the ‘transit 
camps,’ and ruled on September 19 that city officials 
would be imprisoned if permanent housing was not 
properly sought. 
While the corporate-driven governance 
preceding the World Cup did make South Africa 
more accessible to foreign viewers, it came at a 
significant expense. It is important to note that, in 
some circumstances, the securitization processes 
led to an improvement in urban planning, as 
dilapidated buildings were cleared out of inner city 
areas and replaced by new housing and commercial 
developments. However, the local low-income 
communities that lived there previously were sent 
to the periphery of the city, where job opportunities 
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and livelihoods are scarce, schools are far away, 
and housing is unsatisfactory. These peripheral 
relocations have been shown to perpetuate the 
sprawling, fragmented, and racially divided character 
of South African cities.27 COHRE, in one of its “key 
findings” from its 2006 report on South African 
development, State of the Cities, found a myriad 
of development risks associated with peripheral 
relocation.28 These effects include heightened racial 
division, high concentrations of the poor in areas 
with little development opportunities, high rates of 
HIV infection, and a reduction in women’s economic 
autonomy.29 
2014 BRAZIL WORLD CUP SECURITIZATION: 
DECEPTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
The securitization controversy prior to the 
Brazil World Cup has centered on the government 
occupation of the Brazilian slums. This process, 
deemed “pacification” by the Brazilian government 
and “cleansings” by many anti-slum occupation 
activists, pertains largely to Brazil’s urban centers, 
which are home to some of the world’s most vastly 
populated slums and unlicensed living developments, 
commonly called favelas. These favelas consist 
of large unregulated settlements, are often in 
geographically precarious locations, and in some 
cases date back to the 1960s and 1970s.i They usually 
began as temporary living spaces for displaced 
workers and former slaves, but eventually turned 
into permanent living spaces. Strangely, favelas are 
commonly located in highly urban settings, often 
in close proximity to wealthy neighborhoods. The 
close proximity of these favela neighborhoods to 
the major wealth centers of cities, which serve as 
sites for mega-event complexes, has heightened 
the interest in securitizing the areas through the 
government termed processes of “pacification.” At the 
same time, the slum neighborhoods had developed 
complicated socio-political structures and forms 
of self-governance that are averse to governmental 
interference and securitization measures.30
The security concerns associated with the 
favelas, as well as the close proximity of some of 
them to the football stadium in Rio, have made 
i  Some favelas in Brazil date back to the late 19th century as a place of 
residence for former slaves with no options for work or land ownership. 
Modern favelas, those which I refer to, developed in the 1960s and 70s as a 
result of rural exodus. 
securitization procedures in the favelas necessary as 
Brazil prepares for the World Cup. The securitization 
of these favelas can best be broken down into three 
phases: first, by creating the necessary legal and 
institutional framework for securitization through 
the 2011 Master Plan, then by actually carrying out 
pacification, and finally through the use of discursive 
framing in order to sell the securitization. At each 
stage of this process, corporate-driven governance 
played an intimate role in framing government 
policy.
Despite oftentimes vocal local opposition, 
the city government in Rio de Janeiro enacted 
its securitization policy in preparation for the 
World Cup. To do this, it first created the legal 
and institutional basis for the pacification process, 
which resulted in the revised 2011 Plano Diretor 
do Município do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro 
Municipal Master Plan). The Master Plan was created 
and implemented by the Poder Executivo Municipal 
(the executive council) of Rio de Janeiro to form a 
basis for urban development strategy in advance of 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic 
Games. This plan lays out clear favela development 
objectives to “urbanize” and “develop” these slum 
areas to allow private partnerships and corporate-
driven development to occur.31 Section VI, “Do 
Reassentamento de Populações de Baixa Renda 
Oriundas de Áreas de Risco (The Resettlement of 
Populations of Low Income from Risk Areas,),” 
of the plan identifies the geographic areas 
considered “risk areas” such as “fragile hillsides,” 
“lowlands characterized as areas of geotechnical or 
environmental risk,” and other geographic areas of 
the city where favelas exist as targets of relocation.32 
In addition, Section VII extends this favela targeting, 
citing other geographic areas in the city where favelas 
are typically located as “underutilized properties” and 
“risk areas.” These locales are subsequently zoned to 
become sites of new housing projects at the discretion 
of the executive council, which has the additional 
authority to label the favelas as illegal and subject to 
“regulation.”33 Chapter VI specifically authorizes 
police and military control of riverbanks, hillsides, 
and other areas where favelas are present. The 
policies of this Master Plan are extremely broad and 
vague, giving a large amount of discretion and power 
to the UPP forces without thorough democratic 
oversight, despite significant protests by many local 
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community members.34 Thus, the new Master Plan 
policies dismantled existing power structures within 
the favelas and asserted the authority of the state in 
preparation for pacification.
Given this institutional framework for 
pacification, the Brazilian government then took 
the next step of forming of an elite paramilitary 
police force, the Unidad de Policia Pacificadora 
(Pacifying police Unit or UPP) in 2008.  This force 
has commanded thousands of military personnel, 
tanks, and helicopters into individual favelas in order 
to drive out gang leaders that controlled the slums. 
After a larger intervention to begin the securitization 
process, protocol called for the institution of a 
smaller UPP force consisting of a command center 
within the favela in order to maintain order. 
In some cases, these policies have been 
implemented peacefully and successfully, as in slums 
such as the Lins favela in the Northern Zone of Rio 
de Janeiro. In that case, military forces moved at 
dawn without a shot fired, secured the territory, and 
were welcomed by the inhabitants. As Jonathan Watts 
describes in his account: “Then [followed] street 
cleaners with brooms and buckets of whitewash, 
and finally satellite TV salesmen with a three-month 
special offer to first-time subscribers.”35 
Other favelas, however, have seen another side, 
such as massacres and alleged executions by UPP 
forces.36 The “pacification” of the Complexo do 
Alemão favela is no exception to the violence and 
controversy that has characterized the securitization 
process. In June 2007, in anticipation of the 
upcoming Pan-American Games, the Brazilian 
government ordered 1,300 state and federal police 
to surround the favela. According to an official 
investigation, nineteen residents were killed in 
what has become known as the “PAN Massacre.”37 
This massacre occurred to lay the groundwork for 
the construction of a PAC (Growth Acceleration 
Program)-funded cable car project. There are 
numerous other incidents of violence, such as in 
October 17, 2009, when residents shot down a police 
helicopter with a surface-to-air missile.38 Muggah 
and Mulli report that just under 3 percent of the 
favelas in São Paulo have been “pacified,” with all of 
the occupied favelas located in close proximity to 
wealthy neighborhoods, mega-event developments, 
or both.39 São Paulo and Rio de Janiero have 
hundreds of favelas and solely targeting those in close 
proximity to wealthy areas raises concerns as to the 
true intent of these pacification policies. 
The UPP has also failed to reach positive 
solutions for a couple of reasons. First, it has 
remained perpetually understaffed given its rapid 
expansion. The securitization of the Complexo do 
Alemão, occupied in November 2010, was only 
temporarily sustained due to the deployment of 
federal troops. The 2,000-strong UPP police force 
trained for years, and with tens of more UPPs to 
institute, it is hard to affirm the long-term practicality 
of UPPs as viable methods of development. In 
addition to logistical issues, significant financial 
burdens also loom, as the projected completion 
of 100 UPPs by 2016 accounts for over a third of 
the entire state security budget.40 Even if the goal 
of 100 UPPs by 2016 were achieved, there are still 
roughly 900 favelas remaining in Rio alone.41 While 
UPP policies often lead local residents to see favela 
“pacification” as a viable means of creating a mega-
event hosting environment and also a force for 
reshaping the city as a whole through a sustainable 
social services and infrastructural development, such 
broad and long implementation is nearly impossible 
as a result of these personnel limitations.
 Second, UPP actions have been plagued by 
disregard for local input in development decision 
making.42 UPP policies have limited the freedoms 
of those living in the favelas, particularly by 
preventing typical lifestyle practices and inhibiting 
the expression of cultural identities. For example, 
the policies subjected artists to arrests for lyrics 
deemed politically threatening, which are typically 
understood to include songs of the genre baile funk, 
an important cultural cornerstone to the musical 
and art life of the favela.43 The disadvantaged 
political position of the tens of thousands of favela 
residents has stifled their opinions regarding local 
development priorities, increasing their vulnerability 
to instrumentalized policies such as the PAC. In 
the interviews conducted by Sluis in the Complexo 
do Alemão favela, one favela resident expressed 
frustration at the government’s decisions: 
If they’d asked what the community really 
needed, they would have built schools, or a 
university. In what is considered the biggest 
complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro there are 
only two schools, let alone a university. But they 
don’t listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico 
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(cable car) of 500 million Dollars.44
The sidelining of local interests through the 
use of discursive framing to further empower large 
business coalitions and international organizations 
and corporations exemplifies the executive 
committee’s instrumentalization of the PAC program. 
The 2011 Master Plan also laid the ground 
for other types of securitization policies, namely 
city planning programs such as PAC (Growth 
Acceleration Program) and PAC2 (Growth 
Acceleration Program-2). The PAC and PAC2 
projects invested nearly $306 billion through 2010 
in Rio de Janeiro, with a commitment that promised 
additional expenditures of $582 billion from 2011 
to 2014.45 While, on the surface, many of these 
programs would seem to have been beneficial to 
the areas, they often led to problems. One such 
significant PACs-funded project was the construction 
of a cable car in the Complexo do Alemão favela 
in Rio de Janeiro.46 The cable car was intended 
to connect the favelas and make them more safely 
accessible to tourists; however, it resulted in small 
restaurant and store developments around the 
various cable car stations throughout the favela, 
which  were tightly regulated by the government 
and which gave contracts to fast food chains like 
McDonald’s and Bob’s Burgers.47 The prioritizing of 
corporate interests marginalizes the involvement of 
the local community and has left the residents of the 
favela with only low wage positions at these chain 
restaurants. In addition, these cable car stations are 
built in areas that the master plan defined as “areas of 
risk” which contradicts the regulation set forth by the 
2011 municipal development plan.
At the same time, state-sponsored development 
policies such as PAC and PAC2 are overseen by 
organizations such as the executive council and 
other corporate-influenced government institutions. 
Evidence of this oversight can be seen through the 
selective targeting of favelas that are only in areas 
deemed of interest to the business coalitions and 
international organizations such as FIFA and the 
IOC. This examination into “pacification” policy 
implemented for the World Cup in Brazil further 
demonstrates that this mega-event securitization 
policy fails to address local development interests 
due to its lack of sustainability and corporate-driven 
aims, such as in the case of the Complexo do Alemão 
Cable Car project. Instead, these projects are driven 
by corporate interest and serve to harm locals. 
The harm to locals caused by the dominance 
of corporate-driven governance of securitization 
procedures has also been felt in the establishment 
of stadium exclusion zones. These stadium exclusion 
zones have been a critical aspect of FIFA’s profits in 
the two previous World Cups, with the zones often 
extending “far beyond the stadia and the inner 
cities.”48 In the case of Brazil, the zones occupied 
a two-kilometer radius around the stadiums.49 
These exclusion zones are tightly controlled rings 
of security that not only maintain peace, but also 
regulate the vendors. Within these areas, hundreds 
of traditional local vendors would be displaced, 
usually from profitable city center areas, to make way 
for the FIFA-approved vendors.50 The surrender 
of autonomy to business interests through this 
controversial set of legislation is yet another example 
of the decrease in democratization that the FIFA 
World Cup brought to the local communities 
through stadium construction. 
The final mechanism that the government has 
utilized to push through its securitization policies 
for the World Cup has been to frame them positively 
in public media, through discursive framing 
techniques.  The goal of this framing was to imply 
that the favelas were unsafe, which would thereby 
legitimize securitization procedures, regardless of 
the costs to locals. A clear example of the language 
used to make this argument is found in the 2011 
Master Plan, which used terms such as “underutilized 
properties” and “areas of risk.” Favela residents found 
themselves in a significantly hampered legal position 
due to their illegal geographic location. Additionally, 
serious cultural and racial divisions between the 
residents of the favelas and those of the asfalto, 
further complicated the integration of the favela 
residents into the political arena.ii The 2011 Master 
Plan’s distinction between the illegality of the favela 
and the need to preserve the city serves as further 
political justification and framing so as to implement 
undemocratic securitization policies.51 
The discursive framing of the favelas as 
illegal and in need of relocation exacerbates the 
marginalization of local political involvement and 
facilitates an incursion on the lives of the slum-
ii  A Portuguese term used to denote the area and people living outside of the 
favela.  Terms such as this represent the common racial and socio-economic 
tensions that exist between favela and non-favela residents.
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dwellers. 
Delving deeper into the corporate-driven 
governance of pacification policies we can see the 
pervasive discursive framing and the consequential 
jeopardized development opportunities for local 
communities. Yet the sustainability of this model is 
highly questionable, even if the implementation of 
some progressive social programs and infrastructure 
in specific favelas succeeded. 
AFRICA 2010: STADIUM CONSTRUCTION 
POLICIES AND IMPACT
Much like development in Brazil, corporate-
driven discursive framing and instrumentalization 
of the law legitimized stadium development in 
preparation for the South African World Cup. Here, 
we must note that the construction of stadiums 
forms an integral part of two main objectives 
that Maguire cited as underlying a host country’s 
responsibilities: first, using the mega-event as a form 
of “soft power,” and second, leveraging the games as 
a way to address internal concerns such as economic 
regeneration, nation-building, and development.52 
Maenning and Plessis describe the importance of 
stadium developing, arguing that Durban’s new King 
Senzahgakhona would be “the anchor of a concept to 
develop the city area and re-image Durban as one of 
the leading sports cities in Africa.”53 
From the beginning, the decision to build the 
new Moses Mabhida stadium was controversial. 
Although the initial plan was to renovate the 
preexisting Kings Park Stadium, the agreement fell 
apart when a policy shift required the construction 
of an entirely new stadium. This new stadium would 
be built on the site of the Kings Park Soccer Stadium, 
costing the city an additional $240.7 million, 
compared to the projected cost of $5.3 million for 
the renovation of Kings Park. This controversial 
decision to build the Moses Mabhida Stadium 
delivered the same seating capacity that Kings Park 
Stadium would have offered: 70,000 for the World 
Cup and 54,000 after the games. The choices behind 
this change in construction plans can be attributed 
to corporate-driven governance when considering 
the potential for greater profits from the construction 
of a new stadium as compared to a relatively simple 
renovation.
As a centerpiece of development, Durban’s 
new stadium was of great importance to the plans 
of FIFA and the LOC. However, it is not obvious 
whether local South Africans, and indeed the country 
as a whole, truly benefitted from the construction 
of the new stadium. According to a study by Grant 
Thornton, after accounting for $1.8 billion in 
construction costs, the Games increased GDP by one 
and a half percentage points, infusing $3 billion into 
the South African economy. A study conducted by 
Bohlmann and van Heerden disputes these numbers, 
which have been found to vary significantly, and 
concluded that the games have only contributed to a 
0.94 percentage point increase in GDP.54 This lack of 
consensus on the economic effect of stadium building 
makes an economic justification for the stadium 
difficult. 
In fact, we see a detrimental impact on local 
development after examining construction labor 
policies, as well as the decisions of corporations 
that received contracts for the Soccer City stadium 
construction. Although many politicians claimed 
that funding the stadium was justified by the influx 
of local, high-quality construction jobs, a closer 
examination undermines these claims. Seventy 
percent of the local job opportunities from these 
ventures paid less than $245 per month, which is 
10 percent below the national median income. 55 
Seventy percent of the 2,200 local employees were 
also only on limited contracts, and were thus subject 
to high levels of job instability. One example of this 
fluctuation is the decision by security firm Stallion 
Security to fire over 3,600 contracted security 
workers “without warning.”56 More broadly, only 
one hundred workers were offered permanent 
employment with the main contractor after the 
project was completed. 
In addition, the sudden change in focus of the 
quinquennial Johannesburg Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP) reflected the financial burdens of the 
2010 World Cup. According to Hlatchwayo, in 2000, 
the IDP issued extensive policy recommendations 
to increase local public participation, with priorities 
such as “the provision of infrastructure, housing, 
and township establishment, development planning, 
local economic development, the protection of 
the environment, the provision of public health 
services, local safety and security, and a focus on 
delivering services such as water, housing, and 
electricity.”57 Following the 2006 elections, with the 
kickoff of the World Cup less than five years away, 
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priorities shifted, as demonstrated by the new five-
year 2009/2010 IDP: “The 2010 World Cup is the 
biggest project the city of Johannesburg has ever 
undertaken. It is therefore not surprising that in 
the current IDP revision, the 2010 project features 
prominently.”58 Ward meetings, regional meetings, 
sectorial meetings, and the Growth and Development 
summit promoting the 2006/2011 IDP did not serve 
as forums for genuine public discourse, because 
they operated under the terms of corporate-driven 
government.59 Often, these gatherings existed 
solely to serve as a “rubber stamp” for government 
policies.60 This marginalization of the public 
exacerbated developmental issues, and made locals 
unable to voice their needs through accountable, 
democratic institutions.
A massive budget shortfall, which occurred 
as a result of underestimating construction costs 
for the Soccer City stadium, was balanced by 
decreasing funding for public services, a move that 
exacerbated the project’s detrimental impacts on 
local economic welfare. In the area affected by the 
budget shortfall, the eThekwini municipality, features 
a 44 percent poverty rate. Moreover, 8.5 percent of 
households have no annual income and 9.9 percent 
of households have an annual income of less than 
$948, with the average family of four earning less 
than $1 per day per person.61 However, the stadium’s 
final construction cost of $98.3 million drastically 
overshot the initial allotment of $34 million, and 
“put pressure on a council that [was] under pressure 
to deliver basic services.”62 City department heads 
were required to slash their budgets by $65.86 
million, prompting eThekwini’s deputy mayor Logie 
Naidoo to speak on the matter and note that “the 
extra 2010 World Cup costs ‘will certainly affect 
service delivery.”63 The $334.2 million spent on the 
construction of Soccer City could have provided 
202,380 people with permanent housing in the 
province of Gauteng through the local government’s 
Reconstruction and Development Program.64 This 
comparison illustrates the significant opportunity 
costs of the World Cup stadium construction 
projects.65 
In this way, instrumentalized law and corporate-
driven discursive framing produced troublesome 
development projects and policies for local South 
African communities that were in close proximity to 
stadium constructions. Pillay and Bass’s conception 
of “associated development prospects”—additional 
development projects incidental to the required 
infrastructure—reveal a corporate-driven approach 
that sidelined local development projects.66 We 
can therefore see that corporate-driven governance 
is far less effective at promoting long-term local 
community and infrastructure development, largely 
because of FIFA’s strict regulations regarding stadium 
construction, which sacrifice local community 
development interests in favor of private, corporate 
interests.67
After the drone of fans and their vuvuzelas 
faded and the multi-national sponsors and 
construction companies left South Africa, the true 
impact of the World Cup stadium constructions 
became apparent. Despite the billions of dollars 
allocated for World Cup preparation, South African 
President Jacob Zuma insisted that, “it was worth 
every penny spent.”68 However, when looking at 
various construction projects that were not only 
over-budget but detrimental to local community 
development, this statement seems increasingly 
unsubstantiated. President Zuma’s claim embodies 
the rampant discursive framing that rationalized 
the stadium construction policies on the basis of 
supposed economic benefits for local communities. 
BRAZIL 2014: CONTENTIOUS WORLD CUP 
STADIUM CONSTRUCTION 
The headline read “Soccer Stadium the Stage 
as Brazilian Anger Erupts,” as tens of thousands of 
people protested outside of the newly built stadium 
in the Brazilian City of Belo Horizonte. Shortly 
after, for the first time in twenty-five years, the 
Brazilian Supreme Court sentenced a Member of 
Parliament to thirteen years in prison on corruption 
charges. Tensions remained high across Brazil as 
twelve new or remodeled stadiums are prepared for 
FIFA inspections. At the time of this writing, Brazil 
is projected to spend $18 billion in construction 
and remodeling—out of $33 billion over all—with 
stadium construction alone projected at least to 
cost $3.3 billion.69 As in South Africa, Brazil’s 
controversial expenditures has been scrutinized 
for prioritizing public funding of stadiums that 
serve private interests over much needed public 
social services.70 Mega-event expert and theorist 
Christopher Gaffney speaks of the evolution of 
mega-event ideology, comparing Brazil’s hosting of 
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the upcoming 2014 World Cup to the time it hosted 
the 1950 World Cup. Contrary to the democratic 
ideologies that were at the forefront of the 1950 
World Cup, the discourses surrounding the 2014 
World Cup reflect the exigencies of an increasingly 
globalized and corporate-influenced political 
economy.71 This ideological shift and its effects on 
World Cup stadium construction in Brazil have 
sidelined local democratization and development 
interests in the name of “civic boosterism” and 
broader corporate-privileged development.72
I argue that, as in the case of the 2010 South 
Africa World Cup, Brazil’s stadium construction 
policies were delivered through a model of 
corporate-driven governance, in which deregulation, 
privatization, and the funneling public funds toward 
corporate interests dominated government policy. In 
turn, corporate-driven governance undemocratically 
directed funding and policy attention away from 
local development issues, creating environments 
that threatened local civil rights and hampered local 
development. As Gaffney stresses, the driving mantra 
of mega-events is “accelerated development” that 
creates corporate-privileged “dreamworlds.”73 These 
“dreamworlds” empower the executive government to 
meet the stringent deadlines set by FIFA and ensure 
that all event-related projects are carried out so as 
to fully cash-in on the benefits of “civic boosterism.” 
While the effects of stadium construction are known 
to positively affect certain aspects of society, they 
adversely influence democratization within the local 
communities. This section analyzes the impact of 
Brazilian stadium construction prior to the 2014 
World Cup on local communities. 
The construction of the Arena da Baixada, a 
stadium located in the southern city of Curitiba, 
is an important example of how corporate-driven 
governance was able to work in practice. On January 
13, 2010, it was determined that Curitiba’s Arena 
da Baixada would be one of the twelve World Cup 
stadiums. The private club that used the stadium, 
Atlético Paranaense, realized that they would be 
short on funding for the necessary renovations, to 
which FIFA president Marcos Malucelli responded 
that the club should not go into debt because of 
the World Cup. Malucelli claimed that additional 
responsibilities resided with the local city and 
state, prompting the Municipality of Curitiba 
to allocate roughly $40 million toward “special 
building potential” to Atlético Paranaense’s private 
construction project of Américo Guimarães 
Stadium.74 
However, this private funding of the Arena 
da Baixada led to a significant decrease in public 
involvement in policy-making. One of Brazil’s rising 
domestic investigative journalism organizations, 
Comitês Populares, takes a close examination of 
the funding streams in their article, “A Partnership 
for the Cup: The People Pay and the Club Takes.”75   
Although the process of issuing a building certificate, 
along with the requisite funds, was legally permitted 
under the Municipal Master plans, the process 
remained thoroughly undemocratic. The allocation of 
this large sum of public funds was not subject to local 
referenda or any other significant process involving 
public input. Comitês Populares reported that the 
only public engagement in the decision making 
process were two public hearings where citizens, 
civil society organizations, and social activists 
voiced strong concerns and strong objections. 
Furthermore, requests for specific information 
regarding these projects and participation went 
entirely unanswered.76 Leandro Franklin, Chair of 
the Human Rights Legal Practice department at the 
University Federal do Paraná, points out that this 
form of public funding is often given without public 
consultation, and can be deceptively sold to the 
public as private expenditures.77 Marginalization of 
the general public and exploitation of public funds 
under the guise of mega-event “civic boosterism” 
displays the rampant corporate-driven governance 
fomented by the World Cup stadium construction 
process. 
The political process for funding the Arena 
da Baixada in Curitiba highlights significant local 
development concerns. These concerns involve the 
exclusion zone policy, which prioritizes the short-
term business interests of large national construction 
conglomerates and FIFA and its international 
corporate sponsors.78 The allocation of public funds 
away from local development and into stadiums is a 
clear example of Gaffney’s discussion of “neoliberal 
dreamworlds,” where public space is restructured 
and commoditized “in the image of global capital.”79 
In 2007, the then-Sports Minister Orlando Silva, 
like many other World Cup promoters, asserted that 
stadium projects wouldn’t require public money; 
however, the latest estimates, however, show that 91 
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percent of costs associated with the 2014 World Cup 
will be publicly funded.80 
This use of public funds carries with it 
substantial pernicious impacts on local public 
services. Thus, as was the case in South Africa, 
corporate-driven governance has also affected the 
long-term prospects for local development in some 
parts of Brazil. While local organizing committees 
and pro-mega-event evaluators laud the renovation 
and construction of all twelve World Cup stadiums, 
serious concerns remain regarding the legacy of 
these state-of-the-art stadiums. Stadiums such as the 
Arena da Amazônia in Manaus, which cost $256.7 
million dollars, are in communities with lower league 
soccer teams, whose games are attended by less than 
500 spectators in a stadium with a host capacity of 
46,000.81 These stadiums may see little public use 
after the end of the World Cup and cost significant 
time and resources in areas where both are in short 
supply and have pressing public service needs. 
For example, government sources in 2012 reveal 
that 20.2 percent of houses in Manaus do not have 
proper plumbing. Nationally, roughly 15.1 percent of 
Brazilian children up to four years old live in areas 
where sewage runs outdoors.82 Thus, rather than 
being spent on much-need infrastructure in places 
like Manaus, public money has been spent on what 
are expected to be, in the aftermath of the World 
Cup, largely underutilized football stadiums. 
Diminished labor rights for stadium 
construction workers further exemplify the lack 
of substantive public oversight that resulted from 
corporate-driven governance in Brazil. Outcry over 
the paucity of workers’ rights, as in the case of the 
construction of the Arena da Baixada, demonstrated 
the failings of stadium construction policy. For 
instance, work on this stadium project in Curitiba, 
Brazil, was suspended when Brazilian judge, Leonora 
Colnago, ruled that there were safety concerns.83 
Judge Colnago wrote, “countless infractions have 
been committed, in various stages of the building 
project….[that there was] a serious risk of workers 
being buried, run over and of collision, falling from 
heights and being hit by construction material, 
among other serious risks.”84 This placed pressure 
on preparations as FIFA was unrelenting in its 
demand that all twelve stadiums, including Arena 
da Baixada, be “ready for delivery in December and 
[that] no delays will be tolerated.”85 The inflexibility 
of FIFA policy further aggravated civil rights disputes 
because local politicians were given little room or 
time to address labor safety issues. The pressures 
FIFA and powerful government actors placed on 
local officials and workers were further exacerbated 
when the Judge Colnago’s ruling was overturned 
to reopen construction a day after FIFA inspection 
visits began.86 The threat to workers’ safety and 
rights was not limited to Curitiba, and in just one 
example of workplace tragedy, a twenty-two year 
old construction worker fell 115 feet to his death 
on December 14, 2013 at the Arena Amazonia 
only weeks before the stadiums were due for 
completion.87 
Given their influence in local politics, FIFA also 
plays a very significant role in fueling the practices 
of instrumentalization of law and general corporate-
driven governance. The then-recently passed “World 
Cup Law” signed by Brazilian President Dilma 
Rousseff highlights the nature of controversial 
and sweeping FIFA-oriented legislation. The law 
entailed a series of legislative measures that Roberto 
Gurgel, Brazil’s Federal Prosecutor, challenged as 
unconstitutional. Gurgel contended that the law 
violated citizens’ “constitutional guarantee to equal 
treatment, as well as provisions of Brazilian tax 
law.”88 Gurgel, in his filing, writes: 
The World Cup law violates the constitution by 
requiring the state to assume civil responsibility 
- instead of FIFA - for any damages during 
the events. “The exception given to FIFA, its 
subsidiaries, legal representatives, consultants 
and its employees manifestly violate” the 
taxpayers” equal status under Brazilian law. ... 
“Legislators cannot favor a taxpayer in detriment 
to another, but may only identify situations in 
which there are differences which justify different 
treatment.”89 
The questions posed by the Federal Prosecutor 
raise important concerns surrounding the general 
democratic procedures through which policy at 
all levels of government is implemented. These 
allegations of civil rights violations apply not only to 
government politics, but also to the FIFA-mandated 
“stadium exclusion zones” and the resulting 
labor rights standards violations, evictions, and 
displacements.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper advances the existing theoretical 
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notions of development and democratization in 
hosting the 2010 South African and 2014 Brazilian 
FIFA World Cups. More specifically, it scrutinizes the 
securitization and stadium development processes. 
As mega-event hosting venues in developed 
nations fade in importance and developing nations 
increasingly host them, the impacts on local 
democratization and development are even more 
hazardous. The harmful effect of hosting mega-
events in developing nations becomes most apparent 
upon dissecting the implications of corporate-driven 
governance via processes inherent in the political, 
social, and economic environment surrounding 
the World Cup. For both Brazil and South Africa, 
corporate-driven governance has taken the forms 
of discursive framing and instrumentalized law. 
The detrimental effects of policies that have been 
promoted and implemented as a result of corporate-
driven discursive framing and instrumentalized 
law include the disenfranchisement of the local 
population of their rights to just governance 
and sustainable development. These forms of 
marginalization, which originate from both World 
Cup securitization and stadium development, weaken 
the political and socioeconomic participation of the 
local communities while building and fortifying a 
hegemonic corporate-driven system that consistently 
undermines local interests. 
The magnitude and regularity with which 
corporate-driven governance marginalizes local 
communities in developing nations necessitates 
the reconsideration of hosting the FIFA World 
Cup as a mechanism for development. The World 
Cup is headed to Brazil, Russia, and Qatar. These 
three countries share much in common with South 
Africa, particularly with respect to the existence of 
many contentious debates about democracy and the 
outlook for overall development. While the 2014 
FIFA World Cup has not yet taken place, immense 
infrastructural development and new policies have 
and their effects on democratization and local 
development are slowly being revealed. While the 
2022 World Cup games remain years ahead, the 
initial stages of stadium construction have already 
brought controversy. A recent assessment of stadium 
construction in Qatar by the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) projects that more than 
4,000 workers will risk their lives in the next seven 
years while working on World Cup facilities, with a 
weekly death toll that could rise to twelve workers.90 
The reality is clear. Developing nations will continue 
to struggle with maintaining ethical standards for 
development and democratization as they host mega-
events such as the World Cup. 
Addressing these issues will require significant 
international cooperation and investment 
commensurate with the abandonment of existing 
corporate-driven policies and norms. The incredible 
monopoly that the FIFA brand possesses over the 
world’s most popular and profitable sport promises 
immense opportunities for host countries. Yet 
FIFA’s ability to demand sweeping legislation in 
host countries, set its own security and construction 
standards, and put on a show for almost half of the 
world places unparalleled power in the hands of its 
executives. Though this concentration of power has 
proven to be highly vulnerable to corporate-driven 
governance, a reorientation of development policy 
toward local and more democratically accepted 
priorities in the host countries is essential in order 
to ensure that the hosting of mega-events does not 
come at the expense of the host countries’ citizens.
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